> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://dripart-matt-router-pricing-pika-and-guard.mintlify.site/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Upload an asset (single-call multipart) > Single-call `multipart/form-data` upload. The platform streams the bytes through its trusted byte-path, dedups by the server-computed hash, and mints the asset record. The blake3 hash is always computed server-side from the received bytes — a client-declared `expected_hash` is verified, never trusted. The uploaded asset is referenceable immediately; any content scanning runs in the background and does not block the response. ~100 MB single-request expectation for v1; chunked/resumable large uploads are a deliberate open question. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /openapi-v2.yaml post /api/v2/assets openapi: 3.0.3 info: title: Comfy API v2 version: 2.0.0 description: | The official, versioned HTTP API for running ComfyUI workflows from external applications: upload inputs, submit a workflow, observe execution, retrieve results. Design principles: - **Poll-first.** Every capability is reachable via plain GET polling; the SSE stream is a live enhancement, never the source of truth. - **Everything is resumable.** Submission is idempotent; job state and outputs are retrievable by ID until `expires_at`. - **UUID identity, content-addressed dedup.** Assets are UUID-identified records over blobs keyed by a server-computed blake3 hash. The hash is nullable and may be computed lazily. - **Follow links, don't build URLs.** Responses embed follow-up URLs. Additive changes only within v2; breaking changes require v3. servers: - url: http://127.0.0.1:8189 description: Self-hosted (comfy-api-proxy) - url: https://cloud.comfy.org description: Comfy Cloud - url: https://{deployment}.run.comfy.app description: Serverless deployment variables: deployment: description: >- DNS-safe deployment id (subdomain label). Staging uses {deployment}.stg.run.comfy.app. default: dep-1234abcd-56ef-7890-abcd-ef1234567890 security: - bearerAuth: [] - {} tags: - name: assets description: UUID-identified records over content-addressed blobs. - name: jobs description: One execution of a workflow — durable, pollable, cancelable. paths: /api/v2/assets: post: tags: - assets summary: Upload an asset (single-call multipart) description: | Single-call `multipart/form-data` upload. The platform streams the bytes through its trusted byte-path, dedups by the server-computed hash, and mints the asset record. The blake3 hash is always computed server-side from the received bytes — a client-declared `expected_hash` is verified, never trusted. The uploaded asset is referenceable immediately; any content scanning runs in the background and does not block the response. ~100 MB single-request expectation for v1; chunked/resumable large uploads are a deliberate open question. operationId: postAssets parameters: - $ref: '#/components/parameters/IdempotencyKey' requestBody: required: true content: multipart/form-data: schema: type: object required: - file - content_type - file_path properties: file: type: string format: binary description: The raw bytes. content_type: type: string example: image/png file_path: type: string description: >- Placement path / filename (global-namespace-root form, e.g. `photo.png` or `models/checkpoints/x.safetensors`). example: photo.png expected_hash: type: string description: >- Optional client-computed blake3 (`blake3:`). Verified against the server-computed hash; mismatch is rejected with 409 `hash_mismatch` and no asset is minted. example: blake3:9f8a1c0d... tags: type: array items: type: string description: Category tags (e.g. `input`). expires_in: type: integer minimum: 60 maximum: 604800 description: >- Optional retention override in seconds (60s–7d): the asset's `expires_at` becomes now + `expires_in`, replacing the platform's default retention. Implementations without configurable retention ignore it. The bounds apply to this override only — the platform default is operator-configured and may lie outside them. example: 86400 responses: '200': description: Bytes deduped to an existing blob; asset minted over it. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Asset' '201': description: New blob stored; asset minted. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Asset' '401': $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized' '403': $ref: '#/components/responses/Forbidden' '409': description: '`hash_mismatch`.' headers: Retry-After: $ref: '#/components/headers/RetryAfter' content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope' '422': description: >- `idempotency_key_reuse`, `input_blocked` (the bytes are already stored and flagged by content moderation, so `file_path` is not registered for them), or validation failure. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope' '429': $ref: '#/components/responses/RateLimited' '500': $ref: '#/components/responses/UpstreamError' components: parameters: IdempotencyKey: name: Idempotency-Key in: header required: false schema: type: string description: >- Client-generated UUID (recommended). Single-use: the first request to present a key is processed; any later request with the same key is rejected `422` `idempotency_key_reuse` (reject-on-duplicate, no response replay). Keys expire after 24h. schemas: Asset: type: object description: >- A user-owned record identified by a server-assigned UUID, backing an immutable blob whose content carries a server-computed blake3 hash. `hash` may be computed lazily: an asset record (and its retrievable bytes) can exist before its hash is filled in. On an output, `job_metadata` carries the labels its producing job was submitted with, so code holding only the asset knows which run it came from. It is absent for assets no job produced, for outputs of a job sent without labels, where the serving surface keeps no job labels, and when the labels could not be read: so `job_id` without `job_metadata` does not prove the job had no labels. A create whose file path and bytes match an existing output answers with that output, so its `job_id` and `job_metadata` are the output's. required: - id - hash - size_bytes - content_type - created_at - url - url_expires_at properties: id: type: string example: 9f8a1c0d-2b3e-4f56-8a7b-1c2d3e4f5a6b hash: type: string nullable: true description: '`blake3:`; null while lazily computed.' example: blake3:9f8a1c0d... size_bytes: type: integer format: int64 example: 4816293 content_type: type: string example: image/png file_path: type: string nullable: true example: photo.png created_new: type: boolean description: >- On create responses: distinguishes a brand-new blob (true) from a dedup hit against bytes the platform already had (false). created_at: type: string format: date-time url: type: string format: uri description: Short-lived content URL (signed, or proxy-served). url_expires_at: type: string format: date-time expires_at: type: string format: date-time nullable: true description: >- Retention deadline for the asset itself (distinct from `url_expires_at`, the signed URL's validity). Null or absent means the asset is non-expiring. On a dedup-hit create response the deadline may be later than now + the requested/default retention: re-referencing content extends its retention, never shortens it. job_id: type: string nullable: true description: >- ID of the job that produced this asset. Absent for assets no job produced, such as a fresh upload. job_metadata: allOf: - $ref: '#/components/schemas/JobMetadata' description: >- The labels the producing job was submitted with, read through `job_id` on each read. Absent for assets no job produced, for outputs of a job sent without labels, where the serving surface keeps no job labels, when the job is gone, and when the labels could not be read: so `job_id` without `job_metadata` does not prove the job had no labels. ErrorEnvelope: type: object description: | Shared error envelope with machine-readable codes. Core codes (v1): `invalid_workflow` (422), `workflow_format_ui` (422), `missing_asset` (422), `hash_mismatch` (409), `blob_not_found` (404), `idempotency_key_reuse` (422), `queue_full` (429 + Retry-After), `rate_limited` (429 + Retry-After: the caller is past a request rate limit; retry), `insufficient_credits` (402), `not_found` (404), `unauthorized` (401), `forbidden` (403). Deployment-scoped surfaces add: `deployment_not_ready` (429 + Retry-After — the deployment can still reach ready; retry), `deployment_unavailable` (429 + Retry-After: the deployment is ready but its GPU provider is not taking work on it yet; retry), `deployment_stopped` (422 — terminal deployment state; a retry cannot succeed without operator action), `invalid_request` (422: a malformed asset upload or asset-from-hash field, or a jobs-list `limit` that is not a positive integer), `content_blocked` (451: content moderation flagged the asset's bytes) and `sso_required` (403: the key is valid, but the account must sign in through its organization's single sign-on, which does not accept this key). Job labels add: `metadata_invalid` (422: a submitted `metadata` breaks a limit; `details.key` names the key, except for too many pairs, which has no `details`), `metadata_not_supported` (422: this surface keeps no job labels yet), `invalid_metadata_filter` (400) and `invalid_cursor` (400). A surface that does not list jobs yet answers `not_implemented` (501). A 429 is disambiguated by `error.code` alone; clients should treat any 429 + Retry-After as "back off and retry". required: - error properties: error: type: object required: - code - message properties: code: type: string example: invalid_workflow message: type: string example: 'Node 12 (KSampler): required input ''model'' is not connected' organization_id: type: string description: >- On `sso_required`: the organization whose single sign-on governs this key, the one that holds the account, else the one that holds the key's workspace. It is the `organization` query parameter of Comfy Cloud's single sign-on start; treat it as opaque. Absent when the organization is unknown, and on every other code. example: org_01HXYZEXAMPLE details: type: object nullable: true additionalProperties: true description: >- Machine-readable detail for the code. When it carries `node_errors`, that is keyed by node id and each value is a `JobNodeError`, the same shape as a job's `error.node_errors`, whether the refusal came at submit (for example `unknown_node_class`, a node class the deployment's build does not contain) or from ComfyUI after dispatch. With `unknown_node_class` errors it carries `unknown_node_classes`, the missing classes; with `waits_for_browser` errors, `browser_wait_node_classes`, the classes that wait for a browser. A submit refusal names at most fifty nodes. For `invalid_node`, `invalid_inputs` and `invalid_class_type`, when it found more than fifty, `node_errors_truncated` is true and `malformed_node_count` carries the full count; for `waits_for_browser`, `browser_wait_node_count` does. For `unknown_node_class` it names only nodes whose class is one of the at most ten listed in `unknown_node_classes`; when those nodes number more than fifty, `node_errors_truncated` is true and `unknown_node_count` is how many nodes have a listed class. Nodes whose class is past those ten are neither named nor counted. example: node_errors: '12': class_type: SomeCustomNode errors: - type: unknown_node_class message: >- this deployment's build does not contain the node class SomeCustomNode. unknown_node_classes: - SomeCustomNode JobMetadata: type: object description: >- The labels the job was submitted with, exactly as sent. Absent when it was sent with none. additionalProperties: type: string example: client: acme responses: Unauthorized: description: '`unauthorized` — missing or invalid credentials.' content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope' Forbidden: description: >- `forbidden` — authenticated but not allowed. On a serverless deployment, also `sso_required` — the key is valid, but the account must sign in through its organization's single sign-on, which does not accept this key; it can come back on any operation. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope' RateLimited: description: >- `rate_limited` — the caller has exceeded a request rate limit for this account. Account/rate-scoped, not resource-specific — this can be returned even for a job, asset or deployment the caller doesn't own or that doesn't exist. headers: Retry-After: $ref: '#/components/headers/RetryAfter' content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope' UpstreamError: description: >- `upstream_error` — an unexpected failure reaching or processing the request in this implementation's backing services. The message is always a generic, safe-to-display string; implementation detail (the specific upstream, its error text, transport failures) is never included here — see each implementation's own error-mapping notes. Every operation in this contract can fail this way. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope' headers: RetryAfter: schema: type: integer description: Seconds to wait before retrying. securitySchemes: bearerAuth: type: http scheme: bearer description: >- `Authorization: Bearer `. The credential is one of: an account-scoped API key (`comfyui-…`), accepted on Cloud and serverless; a Comfy Cloud session JWT; or an OAuth access token issued for the Comfy Cloud resource. Which kinds a given deployment accepts is deployment configuration — an API key always works on Cloud and serverless, and a deployment that does not accept JWT bearers answers `401` with a message saying so. Self-hosted accepts unauthenticated requests by default and can be configured with a static bearer token. ```` This documentation is built and hosted on [Mintlify](https://mintlify.com), a developer documentation platform.